- Department
- Department of Philosophy
- Phone
- +1 (210) 9998352
- Email Address
- sluper@trinity.edu
- Room
- 122
Born in Bremerton WA.; employed in San Antonio, TX.
Education
- Ph.D. - Harvard University
- B.A. - Baylor University
Selected Publications
- Mortal Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming)
- The Philosophy of Death (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- Cambridge Companion to Life and Death (Cambridge University Press, 2014)
- “Animal Interests,” in Tatjana Višak and Robert Garner, eds., The Ethics of Killing Animals, Oxford University Press, 2016
- “Death,” in Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Medicine, London: Routledge, 2017
- “The Moral Standing of the Dead,” invited, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 373.1754 (2018)
- “Never Existing,” Mortality 23.2 (2018)
Subjects Taught
- Epistemology
- Ethics and Ethical Theory
- Social and Political Philosophy
- Biomedical Ethics
- Philosophy of Death
- Meaning of Life
Community Service & Involvement
- President, Edge Falls Ranches Property Owners Association, 2001-14.
- Board of Directors, Edge Falls Ranches Property Owners Association, 2017-present
- Member, Medical Ethics Committee, Southwest General Hospital, in San Antonio, 2005-2010.
Teaching and Expertise
I have contributed to three areas of philosophy: epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. Currently I am working on topics I discuss in my latest book, Mortal Objects.
Epistemology: In "The Epistemic Predicament" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984) 26-50, p. 38, I defended the condition that has come to be called the safety condition for knowledge. My version was that S knows P only if S's belief P is caused by a sequence of events E each of which is such that if E were to occur P would be true. I then argued that knowledge construed as safety is closed under entailment, and that, as G. E. Moore claimed, we know the denials of skeptical hypotheses.
Ethics: Much of my work on ethics concerns the philosophy of death. In "Annihilation" The Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1985) 233-252, I argued that Epicurus's position that death is not bad for us makes sense only if life is not good for us. In The Philosophy of Death (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) I argue that death is sometimes bad for its victims both in a timeless sense and also retroactively.
Metaphysics: In Mortal Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) I defend a version of the animalist account of our nature. On my version, being a human animal is a contingent feature of an object that is a human animal. In this book I also offer accounts of the nature of material objects, of organisms, and of species. In the latter part of the book I discuss what it is to be alive and what it is to die, and consider related value questions, such as the significance of extinction.
Honors & Awards
- Murchison Term Professorship for 2015-17.
- Distinguished Scholarship Award, Trinity University, 2012.
- Distinguished Service Award, City of Austin, 1980.